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Abstract 
Direct  payments  have  progressively  become  the  largest  and  most  visible  form  of 
support in the CAP tool-box. Analyses on direct payments have always highlighted a large 
inequality in their distribution, both between Member States and, within them, among farmers 
and territories where, on one side, a relevant amount of payments is concentrated in the hands 
of a few beneficiaries; on the other, a small share of support is divided among many heads. 
The European Commission has faced the problem of the volume and the distribution of the 
direct payments with two main instruments: the modulation and the capping. 
Modulation was originally conceived as a temporary  tool aimed at filling  the  gap 
between pillars, but in the last years it has changed shape and rules alongside with the CAP 
process path and it has become one of the milestones of the CAP tool-box. The capping has 
received high attention during each step of the recent CAP reform process, however, it has 
been never implemented so far. Both the instruments have relevant implications about the 
total  amount  of  payments  received  by  farms  and  by  the  Member  States  and  about  their 
distribution; however, the way they are implemented and combined together is crucial to fully 
evaluate their effects. 
The main goal of this paper is to reconstruct the evolution of modulation in the process 
of  CAP  reform,  from  the  voluntary  one  launched  by  Agenda  2000  till  the  most  recent 
proposal of the CAP Health Check, that combines in one single tool modulation and direct 
payments’ capping.  
Simulations of the most recent proposal of modulation show that the goal of Pillar 2 
reinforcement  has  prevailed  over  the  distributional  one,  through  the  creation  of a  sort  of 
national envelope that shifts resources from Pillar 1 to Pillar 2, even though it is not very clear 
so far how and for what that envelope will be spent. Moreover, the capping goal within the 
progressive modulation is not very effective and only affects to some limited extent direct 
payments in few Member States. 
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Introduction 
With the circulation of the review proposals of the common agricultural policy (CAP) 
designed by the Fischler reform in 2003 – the so called Health Check – an overall picture of 
the adjustment process is highlighted (European Commission, 2008 and 2007). The path to be 
followed is quite long and complex, however it is rather clear, even at this stage, that the 
Health Check represents the predictable conclusion of a process started in 2003, although the 
rationale and the consequences of the approach proposed are something more than a simple 
“technical adjustment” of the CAP (Cooper et al., 2007). 
Looking at pillar 1 of the CAP, the proposal outlines the path of the ongoing process 
of decoupling of direct payments, together with the increasing dismantling of the traditional 
market policies. In a nutshell, Pillar 1 reform proposals go into the direction of turning the 
single  payment,  decoupled  on  a  historical  base,  into  a  flat-rate  regionalised  payment, 
addressing more and more the remuneration of environmental and social services through the 
conditionality. In this way, direct payments become, at least in the intentions of the policy 
makers, the rewards for providing goods and services to the whole community rather than a 
compensation  offered  to  farmers  for  the  progressive  dismantling  of  the  specific  supports 
granted to agricultural products. 
As for the Pillar 2, the Health Check draws a picture that apparently seems to reinforce 
the role and the objectives of the rural development policies. However, at a deeper analysis 
one could argue that Pillar 2 has been rather considered as a sort of “black box” where to 
place new functions and measures that are a consequence of the progressive revision of the 
pillar 1 support: possible measures of land management due to the elimination of the set 
aside; a “soft landing” for the milk quota regime elimination, providing specific measures for 
the production in mountain and marginal areas; measures aimed at the management of risk 
coming from further decoupling and the increasing dismantling of market policies; finally, the 
reinforcement  of  measures  concerning  with  climatic  change  and  the  management  of  the 
natural resources. It is not clear at the moment what and to what extent these new functions 
will be included in pillar 2 among all the others, but it can be maintained that it is the sector-
based family of measures that tend to be enhanced, in contrast with the emphasis put on the 
territory-based approach of the pillar 2. 
Given  this  as  a  more  general  picture,  the  debate  around  the  financial  resources 
available for the two pillars of the CAP is mainly focused on the unbalance still existing 
between them, with pillar 1 still representing about 75% of the total expenditure for the CAP, 
and that in spite of the fact that the uneven distribution of resources was highlighted firstly at 
the Conference of Cork in 1996 and then during the debate developed around Agenda 2000. 
Since then, many instruments have been discussed, all concerning the reduction of direct 
payments:  degressivity,  capping  and  modulation.  Degressivity  is  simply  a  progressive 
reduction of the total amount of direct payments enjoyed by farms, never really taken into 
consideration so far. Capping was originally conceived as a cut to the higher brackets of direct 
payments that was supposed to reinforce pillar 1 of the CAP, but it was then set aside. Only   4
recently it popped out again in the Health Check as “upper and lower limits to support levels”. 
Modulation was  launched with Agenda  2000 as a  voluntary instrument  and since then it 
became one of the backbones of the CAP, being the only tool that actively shifts resources 
from the first to the second pillar of the CAP and that redistribute resources among Member 
States. 
The  aim  of  this  paper  is  to  reconstruct  the  fortune  of  the  modulation  of  direct 
payments in the CAP, tracing its evolution from its first appearance on the CAP scene with 
Agenda 2000 in 1999 up to the recent proposal of the Health Check of the Fischler reform of 
June 2003. The continuous change in the rationale and implementation of the modulation 
underlines on the one hand the “experimental” feature of the modulation, on the other the 
deep conflict between its supporters, that are in favour of the reinforcement of pillar 1 at the 
expenses of pillar 2, and those who still are in favour of a larger first pillar, although reformed 
and addressing the secondary functions of agriculture through conditionality. 
More in details, specific attention will be paid to the following aspects: the shift from a 
State-based voluntary modulation to a mandatory one (passing by a new voluntary version); 
the  analysis  of  the  most  recent  proposal  of  modulation  coming  with  the  Health  Check 
proposal (May 2008
1); the theoretical and actual reinforcement of pillar 2 of the CAP, given 
also the financial decisions adopted in 2006; finally, the redistributive effects of modulation 
among Member States. 
 
Modulation from Agenda 2000 to the Health Check 
Modulation was introduced in the CAP tool box with Agenda 2000, in the framework 
of the so called “horizontal regulation” (Reg. 1259/1999) and it featured for the first time a 
voluntary cut in the direct payments (DP) granted to farmers and conceived as a compensation 
for  the  decrease  in  the  institutional  prices.  The  horizontal  regulation  supplied  with  the 
voluntary modulation a legislative framework for the reduction of DP on the basis of parameters 
connected with farm employment, total farm income and total amount of DP received by a single 
farmer, but in any case not exceeding 20% of the total amount: the Regulation fixed these basic 
criteria, but each Member State was allowed to choose whether to apply modulation and how 
(Dwyer  and  Bennet,  2001;  Lowe  et  al.,  2002).  The  same  regulation  also  established  that 
revenues  obtained  through  the  application  of  modulation  had  to  be  channelled  towards  the 
implementation  of  additional  measures  within  the  former  “accompanying  measures”  (Regs. 
2078/92, 2079/92 and 2080/92), and allowances for the disadvantaged areas, all included in 
Regulation 1257/99 on rural development with Agenda 2000. It is, in fact, with Agenda 2000 
that pillar 2 of the CAP took its current shape, and modulation became the tool with which a shift 
of resources from the first to the second pillar was assured (Dwyer and Bennet, 2001). 
At the time of Agenda 2000 the debate arisen around modulation became quite intense, 
shading light on pros and cons of the instrument: on one side, it was considered the first clear 
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signal of the need to balance financial resources between the two pillars of the CAP and to limit 
the expenditure for direct payments. On the other side, most experts were dubious about its 
effectiveness being based on a voluntary approach and having effects only on DP, in a stage of 
the  CAP  life  when  other  forms  of  support  were  quite  relevant  and  CMOs  were  rather 
heterogeneous in terms of tools implemented (INEA, 2000). It is interesting to stress how such 
debate was somehow based on the underlying idea that modulation was a temporary measure 
aimed at launching a signal in favour of the rebalancing of the CAP expenditure, from a sector-
based dominant criterion to a territory-based one. 
Not surprisingly, after almost ten years and two deep CAP reforms, modulation is not 
only still present in the tool box, but it is still the only active instrument that shifts resources from 
the first to the second pillar, and it is actually considered as a milestone of the new CAP. 
Coming to the mid term review of Agenda 2000 (MTR), modulation became mandatory 
and was originally conceived as drastically drawing on the direct payments (20% cut) together 
with the proposal of capping (Henke and Sardone, 2004). However, the resistance of pillar 1 
support ended up in a sensible reduction of the cut, reduced to a percentage that went from 3% in 
2005 up to 5% in 2012, whereas the capping was abandoned. It is worth noting that the actual 
rate  of  modulation  would  have  been  lower  than  the  theoretical  5%  (which,  in  turn,  was 
considered much lower than the proposed 20%), given the franchise established at 5.000 euro, 
according to which the amount of direct payments under that threshold would have not been 
interested by the cut of modulation. Moreover, the franchise, as it will be shown more in detail 
later,  makes  the  actual  cut  also  different  among  Member  States,  and  especially  between 
Mediterranean  partners  and  North  European  ones,  given  the  different  farm  structure  and 
payments’ distribution (Henke and Sardone, 2004; Osterburg, 2006). 
During the 2007 another proposal of a voluntary modulation to put beside the mandatory 
one was discussed, but it was strongly opposed by the European Parliament, that considered it an 
inappropriate instrument to counterbalance the cut that resources for rural development policy 
had  borne  during  the  financial  decisions  in  2006  (Osterburg,  2006).  Eventually,  voluntary 
modulation was approved, but it has been implemented only by two Member States: UK and 
Portugal
2.  
Moving to the latest proposal, the Health Check stresses the importance of modulation as 
a financial instrument for the valorisation of pillar 2, also with a specific reference to the new 
functions generally ascribed to rural development policies in the discussion paper released in 
November 2007
3. However, so far both in this paper and in the following regulation proposals 
                                                
2 According to the new voluntary modulation, Member States have been allowed to raise the rate of modulation 
up to 20%, as originally proposed by the MTR. UK set its modulation at different rates according to Regions 
(from 9 to 14%), while Portugal at 10%. 
3 This document, released on November 20, 2007 to open the discussion about the Health Check proposals, 
explicitly quotes: “With the CAP budget now fixed until 2013, strengthening rural development funds can only 
be achieved through increased co-financed compulsory modulation” (Commission of the EC, 2007, p. 9). In the 
first proposal launched by the Commission, modulation was proposed together with a rather heavy capping of 
the  DP,  but  that  specific  proposal  was  then  deleted,  while  the  progressive  component  of  modulation  was 
proposed.   6
there is no clear evidence  of how the  possible resources coming for the  modulation would 
combine with the rural development funds. 
It is well known that, with the 2005 financial decision, resources for pillar 2 for the 
planning period 2007-2013 were cut down from the expected 88.7 million to 69.7 million euro, 
which were to be topped up by about 8 million euro coming from modulation set up at 5%, 
according to the decisions of the Fischler reform, so that the resources available amounted to 
about 77.7 million euro (Mantino, 2006). This is to say that, in some way, modulation is counted 
on in the balance between the first and second pillar, so it becomes relevant the mechanism of 
modulation itself to know the amount of resources shifted form one pillar to the other.  
 
Table 1 - Progressive modulation according to the Health Check proposal 
Thresholds (in €)  2008  2009*  2010*  2011*  2012* 
0-5.000  0%  0%  0%  0%  0% 
5.000-99.999  5%  7% (2%)  9% (4%)  11% (6%)  13% (8%) 
100.000-199.999  5%  10% (5%)  12% (7%)  14% (9%)  16% (11%) 
200.000-299.999  5%  13% (8%)  15% (10%)  17% (12%)  20% (15%) 
> 300.000  5%  16% (11%)  18% (13%)  20% (15%)  22% (17%) 
* Values in brackets are the progressive rates that are to be added to the basic rate of modulation (5%) 
Source: COM(2008) 306/. 
 
In the most recent proposal of modulation (May 2008), the “old” idea of the capping and 
the modulation are combined together in what is called the “progressive modulation”
4. Such 
proposal is based on a growth of the mandatory modulation rate from 5% up to 13%, gradually 
reached through a annual increase of 2%. Moreover, a progressive rate of modulation needs to be 
added  to  the  “basic”  one,  according  to  different  levels  of  direct  payments,  featured  as  a 
progressive  taxation  system  (table  1).  Progressive  modulation  addresses  two  relevant  issues 
maintained by Commissioner Fischer Boel (Rural Europe, 2007): expanding EU funding for 
rural development support and cut direct payments received by large farms. This would make the 
CAP more equitable and socially accepted. 
It is interesting to note that the raise of the modulation rate, as it will be shown later, 
will bring the actual amount of available resources for rural development policies back at the 
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The modulation in the CAP Health Check 
The implementation of the cut 
In  this  section  a  simulation  of  the  effects  of  modulation  as  designed  by  the  new 
regulation proposal is provided. In order to calculate the cuts on direct payments, the 2006 
data  base  organised  by  the  DG-Agri  has  been  used
5.  The  original  data  set  has  been  re-
organised  according  to  the  specific  topic  of  modulation,  that  is  calculating  all  the  direct 
payments below the threshold of 5.000 euro (the franchise proposed by the Commission) that 
are  not  hit  by  the  modulation,  and  subsequently  organised  according  to  the  progressive 
elements introduced through the thresholds set at 100.000, 200.000 and 300.000 euro. 
Table 2 shows farms and payments submitted to modulation per country for the EU-
15. On average, in the EU-15 75% of the farms enjoy payments below the franchise set up at 
5.000 euro, while only 13.4% of the payments is below the same threshold. Such shares hide a 
high variability among the Fifteens: the Northern partners show a much lower rate of both 
farms and payments under the 5.000 euro franchise, (France 34% of farms and only 3.2% of 
payments; Germany 51% and 6.5% respectively; United Kingdom 49.4% and 3.4%) while the 
Mediterranean countries show a reversed situation (Greece 90.6% and 51%; Portugal  92.5% 
and 28.7%; Italy 91.3% and 31.6%) and Spain in an intermediate position. 
 
Table 2 - Farms and payments per thresholds in the EU-15
Franchise Thr. I Thr. II Thr. III Thr. IV Franchise Thr. I Thr. II Thr. III Thr. IV
Belgium 19,4 24,3 0,1 0,0 0,0 34,5 421,4 7,5 2,1 1,5
Denmark 37,1 32,8 0,7 0,1 0,0 54,4 755,7 83,7 18,0 12,2
Germany 192,5 180,1 2,5 0,9 1,6 329,3 3.285,3 345,5 229,8 860,3
Greece 786,8 81,3 0,0 0,0 0,0 830,7 780,5 3,4 1,2 0,8
Spain 693,3 201,2 2,1 0,4 0,3 822,0 3.138,6 277,5 84,0 140,7
France 145,1 278,1 3,4 0,2 0,1 242,3 6.863,9 417,4 34,2 57,9
Ireland 59,5 69,7 0,2 0,0 0,0 134,1 1.034,7 30,1 2,3 1,5
Italy 1.442,4 135,7 1,6 0,3 0,3 1.093,0 1.945,9 208,3 68,9 139,8
Luxemburg 0,5 1,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,9 30,9 0,6 0,0 0,0
Netherlands 68,2 33,8 0,1 0,0 0,0 70,2 555,4 16,1 3,9 3,3
Austria 88,9 44,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 166,1 486,1 5,7 2,2 4,6
Portugal 221,5 17,5 0,4 0,1 0,0 154,5 297,0 58,3 15,3 13,2
Finland 31,1 33,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 74,3 422,1 3,2 0,5 0,5
Sweden 52,3 30,4 0,3 0,0 0,0 83,5 538,5 33,4 8,4 5,2
United Kingdom 96,4 93,1 4,6 0,7 0,4 118,6 2.457,1 611,5 169,0 167,4
EU-15 3.934,9 1.257,4 15,9 2,7 2,6 4.208,3 23.013,1 2.102,1 639,8 1.409,0
Legenda:
Franchise = < 5.000 euro payments
Thr. I = 5.000 - 99.999 euro payments
Thr. II = 100.000 - 199.999 euro payments
Thr. III = 200.000 - 299.999 payments
thr.  IV = > 300.000 euro payments
Source: elaborations on EU data set (2006)
Farms per threshold ('000) Payments per threshold (Meuro)
 
 
Given the figures in table 2, the results of modulation as proposed in the Health Check 
document are presented in table 3, while in table 4 the shares of the modulation cut in 2012 
(full implementation) per payment thresholds is reported. As it could be expected, the cut 
originating  in  the  first  payment  bracket  is  the  highest  in  all  the  Fifteen,  although  some 
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sensible differences are featured for the highest threshold (300.000 euro), with Germany at 
32.4% and Italy at 13.2%, both well above the EU average (10.8%). 
In table 5 the percent distribution of the amounts originated by the basic modulation 
and the additional progressive modulation is highlighted. It is worth noting that, on the whole, 
the distribution is rather homogeneous between the two components of modulation, even if 
the absolute amounts change.  
 
Table 3 - Modulation according to the new proposed regulation (Meuro)
Basic Modulation
(5%) 2009-2012 2009 2010 2011 2012 2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 15,5 6,3 12,5 18,8 25,0 21,9 28,1 34,3 40,5
Denmark 35,1 15,4 29,4 43,5 57,5 50,5 64,5 78,6 92,6
Germany 189,8 131,6 207,5 283,4 359,3 321,3 397,2 473,1 549,0
Greece 19,0 7,6 15,2 22,8 30,4 26,6 34,2 41,8 49,3
Spain 131,1 63,9 116,3 168,7 221,2 195,0 247,4 299,8 352,3
France 298,3 126,1 245,4 364,7 484,0 424,4 543,7 663,0 782,3
Ireland 35,9 14,6 29,0 43,4 57,7 50,6 64,9 79,3 93,7
Italy 83,7 44,2 77,7 111,2 144,6 127,9 161,4 194,9 228,4
Luxemburg 1,2 0,5 0,9 1,4 1,9 1,7 2,1 2,6 3,1
Netherlands 20,4 8,5 16,7 24,9 33,1 29,0 37,2 45,3 53,5
Austria 13,9 5,9 11,4 17,0 22,6 19,8 25,3 30,9 36,5
Portugal 14,7 7,0 12,8 18,7 24,6 21,7 27,5 33,4 39,3
Finland 12,8 5,2 10,3 15,4 20,6 18,0 23,2 28,3 33,4
Sweden 21,6 9,2 17,9 26,5 35,1 30,8 39,5 48,1 56,7
United Kingdom 145,6 74,2 132,4 190,6 248,9 219,7 278,0 336,2 394,4
EU-15 1038,5 520,2 935,6 1351,0 1766,4 1558,7 1974,1 2389,5 2805,0
Source: elaborations on UE data set (2006)
Additional progressive modulation Total Modulation
 
 
Tab. 4 - Shares of modulation cut per payment thresholds 2012  (%)
Thr. I Thr. II Thr. III Thr. IV Tot
Belgium 96,1 2,4 0,8 0,7 100,0
Denmark 82,3 12,0 3,0 2,6 100,0
Germany 53,1 8,1 6,4 32,4 100,0
Greece 98,6 0,9 0,2 0,3 100,0
Spain 77,1 10,5 3,8 8,6 100,0
France 90,5 7,0 0,7 1,8 100,0
Ireland 95,0 4,2 0,4 0,3 100,0
Italy 70,1 12,0 4,7 13,2 100,0
Luxemburg 98,3 1,7 0,0 0,0 100,0
Netherlands 93,4 4,1 1,1 1,4 100,0
Austria 94,3 2,1 0,9 2,6 100,0
Portugal 68,1 19,9 5,9 6,1 100,0
Finland 98,2 1,2 0,3 0,3 100,0
Sweden 87,9 7,8 2,2 2,0 100,0
United Kingdom 64,0 20,5 6,7 8,7 100,0
EU-15 75,8 9,9 3,6 10,8 100,0
Legenda:
Thr. I = 5.000 - 99.999 euro payments
Thr. II = 100.000 - 199.999 euro payments
Thr. III = 200.000 - 299.999 payments
thr.  IV = > 300.000 euro payments
Source: elaborations on EU data set (2006)  
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Table 5 - Distribution of the modulation cuts among Member States (2012, %)
Basic Mod. (5%) Add. Progr. Mod Tot. Mod.
Belgium 1,5 1,4 1,4
Denmark 3,4 3,2 3,3
Germany 18,3 21,5 19,9
Greece 1,8 1,7 1,7
Spain 12,6 12,5 12,5
France 28,7 26,7 27,7
Ireland 3,5 3,2 3,3
Italy 8,1 8,3 8,2
Luxemburg 0,1 0,1 0,1
Netherlands 2,0 1,8 1,9
Austria 1,3 1,2 1,3
Portugal 1,4 1,4 1,4
Finland 1,2 1,1 1,2
Sweden 2,1 1,9 2,0
United Kingdom 14,0 14,1 14,1
EU-15 100,0 100,0 100,0
Source: elaborations on EU data set (2006)  
 
In 2012, the total cut to direct payments produced by modulation will amount to about 
2.8 billion euro. Of these, slightly more than 1 billion will come from the 5% cut (basic 
modulation, at the same rate as it is implemented nowadays), while about 1,8 billion will be 
originated from the new additional progressive modulation. As shown in table 4, about 27.7% 
of  the  total  cut  of  direct  payments  will com  from  France,  by  far  the  largest  contributor, 
followed by Germany (around 20%) and United Kingdom (14%). 
Finally, in table 6 it is reported the share of the total cut to the total DP per member 
State. It is worth noting that such share coincides with the actual rate of modulation, that is a 
combination of the basic, additional and progressive modulation. The actual rate is rather 
different within the Member States: at the EU-15 level, in 2012 it reaches 8.9%, but this ranks 
from 3.1% in Greece up to 11.2% in the United Kingdom. 
 
Table 6 - Rate of m odulation cut according to the new proposal
2009 2010 2011 2012
Belgium 4,7 6,0 7,3 8,7
Denmark 5,5 7,0 8,5 10,0
Germany 6,4 7,9 9,4 10,9
Greece 1,6 2,1 2,6 3,1
Spain 4,4 5,5 6,7 7,9
France 5,6 7,1 8,7 10,3
Ireland 4,2 5,4 6,6 7,8
Italy 3,7 4,7 5,6 6,6
Luxemburg 5,2 6,6 8,1 9,6
Netherlands 4,5 5,7 7,0 8,2
Austria 3,0 3,8 4,6 5,5
Portugal 4,0 5,1 6,2 7,3
Finland 3,6 4,6 5,7 6,7
Sweden 4,6 5,9 7,2 8,5
United Kingdom 6,2 7,9 9,5 11,2
EU-15 5,0 6,3 7,6 8,9
Source: elaborations on EU data set (2006)
Total cut/Total paym ents (% )
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The reinforcement of pillar 2 of the CAP 
The main task of modulation 
The new modulation proposed with the Health Check combines two main objectives 
of  the  new  CAP:  on  one  side  the  financial  reinforcement  of  pillar  2  through  a  shift  of 
resources  originally  placed  in  pillar  1;  on  the  other  side  the  capping  of  direct  payments 
enjoyed by large farms. The former is an “old” task that deepens its roots in the Conference of 
Cork and the debate about the livelihood of the rural areas in the EU. The latter has more to 
do with  distributive  issues within the EU and the growing need to intervene to limit the 
concentration of direct payments in the largest farms. 
The enhancement of pillar 2 arises a number of questions that are not fully addressed 
by the specific norms of the CAP. Firstly, the amount of resources shifted from the first to the 
second pillar of the CAP does not follow the actual distribution of the financial support per 
country but rather tends to alter it. This, of course, can be a positive result in itself, and it is 
worth  underlining  here  that  modulation  does  affect  the  resource  balance  among  Member 
States and among farms. Secondly, the shift of resources from pillar 1 to pillar 2 can be 
opposed not only by the supporters of pillar 1 – those that prefer to receive money for their 
status of farmers and according to the historical distribution of direct payments – but also by 
the national governments that should add resources on their own because of the co-financing 
rule of pillar 2
6. 
Finally, another relevant issue is the fact that modulation adds progressively resources 
to the rural development programmes (RDPs)
7. Such shift opens relevant issues, that needs 
further discussion. One has to do with the concentration of resources on specific objectives, 
the  other  with  the  timing  of  expenditure.  The  regulation  proposal  on  this  matter  is  quite 
unclear, naming as objectives specific schemes addressing the “new challenges” facing the 
European  rural  environment:  climate  change,  bioenergies,  biodiversity  and  water 
management.  Another  issue  has  to  do  with  the  fact  that,  with  modulation,  the  pick  of 
resources shifting from pillar 1 to pillar 2 would be reached in 2012, when the planning 
period is practically over. It is then not very clear when and how those resources would be 
available for the programmes, especially in a totally uncertain future of the CAP and the rural 
development policy after 2013 (Mantino, 2007)
8. Finally, considering also the national co-
financing of resources coming from modulation into the RDPs, there may be a serious risk of 
over-financing of the plans, with the institutions managing the plans (Regions, States) unable 
                                                
6 On this matter, there is no agreement within the Member States. It might also be agreed that the resources 
coming for the additional progressive modulation do not need co-financing. This would create an important case 
for the financial support of the CAP under Pillar 2.   
7 It has been noted that the link between Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 does not found on solid ground: the regional 
allocation of modulation depends ultimately on the historical distribution of Pillar 1 payments and on farm 
structures;  moreover,  resources  coming  from  modulation  often  address  “accompanying  measure-  like” 
interventions, for which expenditure is simpler and whose main objectives are internal to the primary sector 
(Osterburg, 2006). 
8 About this specific issues, it is possible that the Commission takes into consideration a different schedule for 
the actual expenditure of resources coming from modulation, not following the n+2 module.   11
to spend in a effective way all the resources in the programmed time, even considering an 
extended period for them (n+x>2). 
Said  that,  in  the  next  pages  the  focus  will  be  on  the  process  of  reinforcement  of 
financial  resources  for  pillar  2  coming  from  modulation.  According  to  what  the  new 
regulation proposal says, the amount of resources raised with modulation will follow two 
main streams: the 5% cut (that is, the “old” mandatory modulation, net of the franchise) 
would return to the EU that will redistribute the resources among Member States according to 
a key that combines three elements: the share of labour in agriculture, the share of UAA and 
the  GDP  per  capita
9.  All  the  rest  of  the  modulation  (the  additional  and  the  progressive 
modulation)  would  be  used  to  create  a  sort  of  “national  envelope”  that  would  transfer 
resources from pillar 1 to pillar 2 within the same Member State. According to this complex 
mechanism, the redistributive effect of the new modulation is quite reduced, being it limited 
only to the original 5% cut of the direct payments and to the franchise. The contribution of 
modulation to pillar 2 and its effects are shown in the next tables. Table 7 reports the shares of 
resources according to their destination: it is worth noting how the share that returns to the EU 
to be redistributed according to the “objective criteria” reduces by time, while the national 
envelope increases: in 2012, at the EU level, 37% of the total modulation cut returns to the 
EU for redistribution and  63% is transferred  to the Member States pillar  2, but only  for 
addressing the “new challenges”. 
 
Tab. 7 - Shares of modulation resources according to their destination
EU Envelope EU Envelope EU/ Envelope EU Envelope
% % % % % % % %
Belgium 71,0 29,0 55,3 44,7 45,3 54,7 38,3 61,7
Denmark 69,5 30,5 54,4 45,6 44,7 55,3 37,9 62,1
Germany 59,1 40,9 47,8 52,2 40,1 59,9 34,6 65,4
Greece 71,4 28,6 55,5 44,5 45,4 54,6 38,4 61,6
Spain 67,2 32,8 53,0 47,0 43,7 56,3 37,2 62,8
France 70,3 29,7 54,9 45,1 45,0 55,0 38,1 61,9
Ireland 71,1 28,9 55,3 44,7 45,3 54,7 38,4 61,6
Italy 65,4 34,6 51,9 48,1 43,0 57,0 36,7 63,3
Luxemburg 71,8 28,2 55,8 44,2 45,6 54,4 38,6 61,4
Netherlands 70,5 29,5 55,0 45,0 45,1 54,9 38,2 61,8
Austria 70,3 29,7 54,9 45,1 45,0 55,0 38,1 61,9
Portugal 67,8 32,2 53,3 46,7 43,9 56,1 37,4 62,6
Finland 71,3 28,7 55,5 44,5 45,4 54,6 38,4 61,6
Sweden 70,0 30,0 54,7 45,3 44,9 55,1 38,1 61,9
United Kingdom 66,2 33,8 52,4 47,6 43,3 56,7 36,9 63,1
EU-15 66,6 33,4 52,6 47,4 43,5 56,5 37,0 63,0
Source: elaborations on EU data (2006)





                                                
9 The Health Check paper does not provide any information about the actual implementation of the modulation, 
so it is assumed here that the criteria will be exactly the same as indicated in the Reg. 1782/2003.   12
 The shift of resources to pillar 2 
The percentages of modulation may well change in the future and be set up at a much 
more conservative level, but the trend towards a progressive shift of resources from pillar 1 to 
pillar 2 is to be considered irreversible, after so much talking about it and notwithstanding the 
current preoccupations of the local administration about the extra-budget devoted to pillar 2 
that needs to be  managed on the RDPs. 
Table 8 shows that the redistribution process activated by modulation in favour of 
pillar 2 is positive for Greece, Spain (the largest beneficiary given these rules of modulation), 
Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. In other words, the largest beneficiaries are 
the Mediterranean countries plus countries whose the farm structure is mostly characterised 
by small units. Of all the net contributors, the largest is by far France (around 650 million 
euro), followed by Germany (390,5 million euro) and United Kingdom (306 million euro). All 
in  all,  13.6  billion  euro  are  transferred  to  pillar  2  with  modulation;  such  amount 
counterbalances what had been previously cut from the rural development budget during the 
financial perspective discussion for 2007-13. Of course, the distribution among countries is 
different from that following the financial decisions, for two reasons: firstly, the distribution 
criteria among countries is different; secondly, the NMS are included in the repartition of the 
resources for rural development, while will not be included in the modulation before 2013 
(Mantino, 2005). 
 
Table 8 - Distribution of  resources coming from modulation (2007-13, Meuro)
Cut Redistr. Envelope Tot Mod Balance
Belgium 196,2 72,7 87,6 160,3 -35,9
Denmark 449,1 123,6 203,3 326,9 -122,1
Germany 2669,2 937,8 1.340,9 2.278,7 -390,5
Greece 239,1 516,2 106,3 622,5 383,4
Spain 1708,9 1.344,9 791,2 2.136,2 427,3
France 3792,2 1.439,4 1.704,4 3.143,8 -648,4
Ireland 454,0 196,3 202,5 398,8 -55,2
Italy 1108,3 937,8 522,3 1.460,1 351,9
Luxemburg 15,0 7,3 6,7 13,9 -1,1
Netherlands 259,3 159,9 116,3 276,2 16,9
Austria 176,8 305,3 79,4 384,7 208,0
Portugal 190,4 356,2 87,7 443,9 253,5
Finland 162,0 130,9 72,1 203,0 41,0
Sweden 275,1 145,4 123,9 269,3 -5,8
United Kingdom 1913,9 712,4 894,9 1.607,4 -306,6
EU-15 13.609,4 7.269,8 6.339,6 13.609,4 0,0
Source: elaborations on UE data (2006)  
 
In fig. 1 the comparison among the 2003 reform and the Health Check in terms of 
capacity  to  bring  additional  resources  to  pillar  2  is  presented  (2007-13).  It  is  worth 
underlining that, in the case of the Fischler reform with a stable cut at 5% from 2007 to 2013, 
the additional resources for pillar 2 would amount to 14.2% of the total (51 billion euro),   13
while with the Health Check proposal they would reach 26.6%. In comparison to the version 
of modulation in Reg. 1782/2003 (that reached 7.280 million euro), the new proposal supplies 
an additional amount of resources equal to about 6.300 million euro for the EU-15. In the 
same figure it is also shown the possibility that the new modulation would not include the 
progressive component and be limited to the additional one. In that case, the total amount 
modulated would equal to slightly more than 13 billion euro (2007-2013). This shows how 
the  progressive component  of modulation does not alter  significantly the  total amount of 
resources shifted to pillar 2 (around 600 million euro in the whole period), but is launches an 
important signal into the direction of redistributive issues
10. 
 














In table 9 the additional resources for pillar 2 per Member State are reported, with a 
comparison with the current mandatory modulation (5%) and also with the hypothesis of the 
new modulation without the progressive component. Given the actual distribution of the funds 
for  RDPs  for  the  planning  period  2007-2013,  the  additional  resources  coming  from 
modulation modifies quite evidently the whole picture: with the Health Check proposal, in 
United Kingdom they represent 84.2% of the total funds, 73.4% in Denmark, 56.8% in the 
Netherlands, and so on; the lowest share are shown by Finland and Austria (both at 9.8%). 
Looking  at  the largest EU-15 countries, the situation  is still quite heterogeneous: besides 
United Kingdom, France is at 48.8%, Italy at 17.6%, Germany at 28.1%. In any case, as was 
expected, the new modulation would generally increase the amount of resources shifted from 
pillar 1 to pillar 2. This can be seen as a positive trend if one shares the point of view of the 
                                                
10 It is worth underlining that the progressive component of modulation does not alter the balance of modulation 
in terms of distribution, given that it is supposed to remain in the “national envelope”. The beneficiaries and the 
contributors are determined only by the basic component of modulation (5%) that is redistributed according to 
the “objective criteria”.   14
Commission and of many stake holders, but it is a heavy constraint according to supporters of 
pillar 1 and also to the managers of RDPs at the local level, that might consider a risk the 
over-concentration of resources on pillar 2
11. It is quite interesting to note that, all in all, the 
progressive element does not add many resources to pillar 2: most of the countries would 
remain at the same rate of additional resources, with the clear exceptions of Germany and 
United Kingdom. This means that the extra-burden of the progressive component of the new 
modulation would be borne by only two Member States. Such component, in conclusion, has 
a relevant political cope but not as much as an economic and redistributive one: this could 
give the negotiation a strong element to go in favour of a dismantling of the progressive 
component of modulation. 
 
T able 9 - C om parison of resources added to R D  (2007-13)
R D M od. 2003
(M euro) (% ) tot. (% ) - prog. (% )
B elgium 418,6 38,3 38,1 18,8
D enm ark 444,7 73,5 72,0 33,1
G erm any 8.112,5 28,1 24,7 12,5
G reece 3.707,3 16,8 16,8 11,8
Spain 7.213,9 29,6 28,8 17,6
France 6.442,0 48,8 48,3 24,6
Ireland 2.339,9 17,0 17,0 8,9
Italy 8.292,0 17,6 17,0 10,6
Luxem burg 90,0 15,5 15,5 8,0
N etherlands 486,5 56,8 56,4 30,0
A ustria 3.911,5 9,8 9,8 6,8
Portugal 3.929,3 11,3 11,2 7,8
Finland 2.079,9 9,8 9,7 5,8
Sweden 1.825,6 14,8 14,6 8,1
U nited K ingdom 1.909,6 84,2 80,0 40,4
E U -15 51.203,4 26,6 25,6 14,3
Source: elaborations on U E data (2006)




The last fifteen years of CAP reforms have seen a progressive shift of the political 
focus  from  market  tools  to  rural  non-sector  tools,  even  though  the  financial  resources 
available for the two pillars are still quite uneven distributed. Presently, it is very hard to 
acknowledge pillar 1 as a market oriented set of policies and pillar 2 as a “pure” territorial 
one, for three main reasons. In no particular order, the first is the actual dismantling of market 
policies (still going on also with the Health Check proposal). The second has to do with the 
mix of policies under pillar 2, addressing different issues according to the logic of the Axes 
(sector-based,  environmental,  territorial).  Finally,  the  third  is  the  increasing  level  of 
integrations  between the two pillars, so that it is  more and more difficult to  include one 
intervention into one or the other pillar. Moreover, in spite of the emphasis registered in all 
                                                
11  The  increase  of  resources  originated  with  modulation  can  be  considered  a  problem  also  by  National 
government that should co-finance measures in Pillar 2. The case and extent of co-financing resources coming 
from modulation is an issue currently under discussion.   15
the official papers of the EU about the need to enhance pillar 2 of the CAP, the results are 
quite disappointing, especially if one considers the budget cut borne in 2006. 
Starting from Agenda 2000 and still in the most recent CAP reform proposal in 2007, 
modulation is by far the main instrument that shifts resources from the first to the second 
pillar of the CAP, being the other policies within some CMOs (tobacco and wine). Is such 
shift a good thing? The supporters  of the traditional  market policies would say  it  is not, 
mainly because it is a way to cut “certain” resources to farmers that return in a much more 
complicated way to the rural areas but not necessarily to the farmers and certainly not to those 
ones that bear the cut. On the other hand, the complex network created around the rural areas, 
made  of  local  institutions,  non  government  organisations,  research  institutions,  groups  of 
citizens and of farmers, environmental organisations and so on see very much in favour a 
progressive  reinforcement  of  pillar  2  that  overlaps  also  with  a  more  decentralised 
management  of  the  CAP  expenditure  and  with  a  financial  involvement  of  the  national 
governments (co-financing). 
From a more theoretical point of view, the whole process of reinforcement of pillar 2 
should better be placed in a wider rethinking of the future of the CAP and the EU budget 
(Esposti, 2007; IEEP, 2007). The whole process of CAP reform seems to design two pillars 
whose  boundaries are less and less clear and also  more and more difficult to justify. As 
underlined before, the objectives and the instruments of both pillars tend to become similar, 
while the functioning and the financing rules are still quite different. 
Coming to the specific tool of modulation, it still is the only active instrument of 
reinforcement of pillar 2, according to a logic that seemed to respond more to a temporary 
than  to a  stable financial  mechanism.  Looking  at  the  latest  version  of  modulation  in  the 
Health Check proposal, it is evident how modulation is moving from a “symbolic approach”, 
with a marginal cut of direct payments, to a more relevant one, that ensures, altogether, quite 
a relevant amount of resources to pillar 2, often increasing by a relevant amount the total 
resources available for the rural development policies. 
With regards to modulation and the new Member States, it has to be underlined the 
specific features of the pillars in these countries, where the actual distribution of financial 
resources is rather different form the Fifteen and relatively in favour of the rural development 
policies. Given this picture, does modulation have a role in the new Member States? Given 
the  redistribution  effect  of  modulation,  this  could  in  the  future  become  another  cause  of 
conflict among old and new Member States in terms of competition for resources (Henke and 
Storti, 2005). 
In conclusion, looking at the more general issue of the distribution of resources among 
pillars, two aspects need to be underlined: one has to do with the instrument of modulation in 
itself; the other, more general, with the increase of resources for the policies within pillar 2 of 
the CAP. Modulation activates a flow of financial resources that basically depends on the 
distribution  of  the  funds  allocated  for  pillar  1:  if  the  logic  behind  this  is,  on  one  hand,   16
understandable and to be supported to some extent, on the other it is hard to accept that the 
shape and the strength of one pillar is to depend on the other. As for the second aspect, as said 
earlier, the increasing overlapping of objectives, rules and mechanisms of the two pillars at 
this stage of the reform process would require a deeper debate about their future and, in a 
more general way, about the future and the scope of the financial resources of the CAP within 
the EU budget. 
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